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Due to the gravity of its environmental problems where 16 of the 20 most polluted 
cities on earth reside in China, the national development strategy for environmental 
protection has become more focused since the Sixth National conference on 
Environmental Protection in 2006. The government has set the strategic goal of 
striving for a harmonious ‘Xiaokang’ Society by the year 2020. The State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) is keen to encourage the business 
sector to engage in environmental initiatives.  
 
This paper is part of a larger empirical study grounded on senior managers’ 
perceptions of corporate environmental management (CEM) in the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). To explore the emerging phenomenon of CEM in Shanghai, an 
appropriate research methodology is used. ‘Coercive Government Institutional 
Involvements’ emerged as one of the major influencing factors in corporate 
environmental initiatives. The State regulatory regime has been perceived by Chinese 
managers to be the most influential, most complex, and least predictable on 
organisational environmental performance. 
 
The study is limited to an investigation of CEM in Shanghai but the implications of 
this exploratory research is that environmental management systems that work in  
developed nations should not be directly transplanted to developing nations without 
considering institutional contexts. Business enterprises operating in the PRC needs to 
be vigilant and aware that notwithstanding, its dynamic economic boom and 
modernisation, the state has tremendous influence.  
  
 
 Keywords: China, Corporate Environmental Management, State Development 
Strategy; and Institutional Theory. 
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CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE ON 
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the past two decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been enjoying 
an incredible GDP growth rate of 9-10% per annum.  Notwithstanding the current 
massive global economic downturn (i.e., the Economist Intelligence Unit expects real 
GDP growth to slow sharply to just 6% in 2009), such an unbridled economic growth 
has alleviated millions of people out of poverty but is taxing the planet. China is home 
to 16 of the 20 most polluted cities on earth (World Bank, 2001).  
 
The PRC government has set the goal of striving for a harmonious ‘Xiaokang’ Society 
by the year 2020. In achieving the goal of developing national economy and 
protecting ecological environment whilst maintaining social equity, China will need 
to quadruple its gross national product (GNP) of 2000. This will cause enormous 
challenges in managing depletion of natural resources and environmental pollution. 
As the most populous nation on earth with an insatiable appetite for natural resources 
to boost its economic growth, therefore the Chinese State has a prominent role in 
solving global environmental challenges (Diener and Rowe, 2007).  
 
In response to the severity of its environmental problems, China has enacted and 
implemented a series of policies, principles, regulations and laws since the 1970s. 
Certain strategic policies such as the legally mandated environmental standards can 
coercively be imposed upon business enterprises. The State regulatory regime has 
been perceived by Chinese managers to be the most influential, most complex, and 
least predictable on organisational performance (Tan and Litschert 1994). Hence, it is 
imperative to understand senior managers’ perceptions of ‘Coercive Government 
Institutional Involvements’ that emerged as one of the major influencing factors in 
corporate environmental initiatives (Rowe and Guthrie, 2007). 
 
The paper is structured as follows: the following Section two provides a brief 
background of the Chinese Government’s management of environmental degradation, 
followed in Section 3 by the rationale for utilising the chosen research methodology 
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to explore senior managers’ perceptions of corporate environmental management 
(CEM). Section 4 provides the findings from this empirical study about the ‘Coercive 
Government Institutional Involvements’ that emerged. Section 5 provides a discussion 
and the paper concludes in Section 6 with some implications and recommendations 
for future research. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm was a 
turning point for China’s environmental management efforts. Since then, a 
fundamental national environmental policy and legislative structure have been 
gradually established. This led to China’s first National Environmental Protection 
(NEP) Conference in August 1973 in Beijing.  Environmental Protection Offices 
(EPOs) were established in May 1974, which pronounced the first PRC’s 
environmental regulation popularly known as San Tong Shi (STS), interpreted as the 
‘three simultaneous regulations’  or ‘three synchronizations’ (Zhang 2001).  
 
The promulgation of the ‘Environmental Protection Law for trial implementation’ and 
formation of the EPOs in the late 1970s managed the environmental policies, laws, 
regulations and standards. By the turn of the Millennium, China had enacted forty-
three environmental related laws since 1979, namely – six environmental protection 
laws, nine resource conservation laws and twenty-eight pieces of environmental 
administrative regulations (Zhang 2001). 
 
In recent years, the “Cleaner Production Promotion Act” was enacted requiring 
industrial enterprises to implement cleaner production for environmental 
improvement (Guo 2005).  On 16 June 2003, the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) promulgated the “Regulations of Environmental Inspection 
on Companies accessing to or Refinance from Stock Market.” It aims to prevent 
environmental risks associated with listed companies from heavy polluting industries 
(e.g., metal, chemistry, oil, coal, and constructions).  
 
On 5 November 2003, the SEPA issued the “Bulletin on Information Disclosure of 
Corporate Environmental Performance” (SEPA 2003). This regulation requires non-
compliant companies to produce environmental reporting to the public allowing the 
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Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) to release the names of these non-compliant 
enterprises to the public through the media (e.g., newspapers, television and 
websites). 
 
In February 2005, the Standing Committee of National People's Congress of China 
(SCNPC 2005) promulgated “The Renewable Energy Law”  which was enforceable 
from 1 January 2006. China’s National Eleventh Five-Year Program (2006-2010) for 
National Economic and Social Development, introduced in October 2005, will 
enhance China’s environmental policy and legislation with more stringent 
environmental standards.  
 
During the April 2006 national conference on environmental protection, Premier Wen 
Jiabao reaffirmed the strategic importance of the environment (China Daily, 18 April  
2006). In setting priorities for environmental protection, Premier Wen stressed that 
officials will be assessed on their environmental performance. Whilst targets for 
economic growth were easily met in the PRC’s 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), the 
same cannot be reported for major environmental protection objectives. This was 
attributable to “lack of awareness, insufficient planning, illogical industrial structure 
and a weak legal framework” in some regions (Premier Wen, cited in China Daily, 18 
April, 2006). 
 
According to Li and Fung Research Centre (2005), China’s current 11th Five-Year 
Program (2006-2010) will concentrate on the “people first” principle, thereby 
focusing on the issues of innovation, sustainability, social harmony, wealth sharing, 
economic growth, conservation and quality over quantity. Rowe’s (2008) 
evolutionary ‘epic’ of China’s Environmental Management Institutions” provides a 
historiography analysis of the PRC’s government’s advancement in tackling complex 
environmental sustainability that impacts on business enterprises operating in this fast 
growing economic power house.  
 
Rowe (2008) research one outstanding issue - state intervention in the environment 
via rules, directives and legislations, but what impact does that have at the 
organisational level and CEM? This paper’s aim is to examine perceptions of senior 
managers in Shanghai as to the impact of State environmental intervention on their 
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actions and organisation. The following section outlines the research methodology 
followed. However, to what extent do organisations perceive the role of the Chinese 
government in influencing their CEM in Shanghai? 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To investigate senior managers’ perception of the emerging phenomenon of CEM in 
Shanghai, constructivist ontology was chosen using a modified grounded research 
approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990; 1994; Whiteley 2004). The constructivist 
paradigm can help senior managers and policy-makers discover what is happening, 
and why organizational actors do what they do (Parker and Roffey 1997), thereby 
contributing to an understanding of CEM activities. 
 
From the assumptions of constructivism ontology, the appropriate epistemology is 
therefore interpretivist (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Lincoln and Guba 2000). The 
‘realities’ presented by the respondents must be interpreted and understood 
(verstehen), rather than empirically measured, and explained (erklären). 
 
Multiple case study method was the research strategy that facilitated the 
understanding of the dynamics of the senior managers’ response to CEM within their 
organisational case settings. The case context allowed the researcher to use 
‘controlled opportunism’ to respond flexibly to discoveries made in collecting 
emerging data (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Eisenhardt 1989 p. 539). Whilst case 
studies can combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, 
questionnaires, and observations, and the evidence may be qualitative (e.g., words), 
quantitative (i.e., numbers) or both, this study focused on qualitative (e.g., text, 
interview and observation) evidence, which was collected in interaction with senior 
managers.   
 
This multiple case study method had been guided by grounded research approach 
using systematic data preparation and management (Strauss and Corbin 1990; 1994; 
Whiteley 2004). A grounded research approach “is a general methodology for 
developing theory that is grounded in the data systematically gathered and analysed. 
Theory evolves during actual research, and it does this through continuous interplay 
between analysis and data collection” (Strauss and Corbin 1994 p. 273). 
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Whilst a modified version of the original grounded theory was adopted for this 
exploratory study, the basic framework was kept in terms of allowing important 
responses to emerge the case studies institutionalised settings. This allowed the sifting 
and analysis of a large amount of data in non-standard and unpredictable formats. 
 
Senior managers and executives from fifteen enterprises were interviewed between 
2001 and 2005. Further informal contacts in Shanghai were made in 2007. According 
to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
office in Beijing “company managers are a key target group of major importance to 
the environmental situation in China” (Hebel 2003, forward). 
 
The interviews were a way of tapping the thoughts of subjects and examining how 
they each perceived the reality of CEM and the meaning that they construed around 
that. In order to reflect the diversity of companies in Shanghai, the fifteen 
organisational cases selected for this research were of different types and sizes.  
 
The interviews were audio taped (whenever possible) and field notes were 
immediately documented within 24 hours, so as not to lose the vital nuances and cues 
observed. The taped interviews were transcribed and rigorously reviewed for errors by 
both the researchers and Chinese translators. Tapes were carefully listened to 
following the Strauss and Corbin (1990) framework, and corrections were made. The 
trustworthiness of transcripts was carefully assessed following Poland’s (1995) 
methods. 
 
Only the views of the most senior managers/executives of each of the organisations 
were taken into account for each case (unless contrary views by majority of managers 
prevailed), while the data gathered from the rest of the managers (within the same 
enterprise) took on a supportive role. Hence, prolonged engagement added to the 
rigour and trustworthiness of the data collected in Shanghai (Lincoln and Guba1985). 
Full details of the research methods, samples and the interviews are explained in 
detail in Rowe and Guthrie (2007). This paper uses part of the empirics from the 
wider study to specifically examine the issue of coercive government institutional 
involvements in CEM as perceived by senior managers in Shanghai.  
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4. COERCIVE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENTS 
In this empirical study, coercive government institutional involvements emerged as 
one of the major influencing factors of CEM. What is to follow in this section is:  4.1 
State Strategic Environmental Polices and Rules; and 4.2 Preferred Environmental 
Strategies 
 
4.1 State Strategic Environmental Policies and Rules 
Respondents were of the opinion that problems relating to the environment were best 
resolved by the government at the macro-level. However, when asked about ‘who is 
responsible for environmental protection?’ – the respondents were equally divided in 
suggesting that environmental responsibility rests with both the government and every 
individual. And yet, 73% of those interviewed, emphasised the importance of Chinese 
government’s institutional role in solving environmental problems. It was expected of 
the government institutions to address China’s environmental concerns by 
establishing State strategic environmental policies, regulating environmental laws and 
rules, and monitoring and enforcing them. The major concept of coercive government 
institutional involvements (Rowe 2008) that is perceived to influence CEM surfaced 
from some of the following quotations3 by participants.  
 
 // The government is not doing enough to solve environmental degradation 
problems // Chinese government appears to be reactive rather than proactive to 
environmental degradation problems // The government may pressure other 
enterprises to consider environmental protection policies // government is seen 
to be implementing its environmental policies // it is a national issue, macro 
policy // the governments have financial problems, not enough funds to solve 
environmental problems // the government is aware but because of the short of 
funds, cannot afford big scale environmental protection // under a wise 
government, the state, we can do it // we know that the government’s policy 
                                                 
3 Each interview was recorded in either English or Chinese; the researcher understood and spoke 
Mandarin, and then the material was translated. The interview date is presented mixed together for 
ethical reasons and also to consolidate the sample of senior manager’s perceptions.  
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has a long term plan. It considers environmental protection at the same time as 
development takes place. // 
 
As highlighted from these selected quotations, there were recurrent emphases on the 
influence of government institutional involvements in CEM.  
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the linkages between the supporting categories i.e., (macro 
environmental policies and laws; compliance; and monitoring and enforcements) and 
the conceptual theme of ‘coercive government institutional involvements’ that 
influenced CEM. 
 
Figure 1: Coercive Government Institutional Involvement 
Categories    Concept    




       





The conceptual theme of coercive government institutional involvements in CEM was 
supported by three main categories - macro environmental policies and laws (60% of 
companies); compliance with environmental legislations (53% of companies); and 
monitoring and enforcement (73% of companies). From the perspective of the senior 
managers, the major concept of coercive government institutional involvements in 
turn, influenced CEM. 
 
The pivotal role of Chinese government’s institutional involvements in macro 
environmental policies and laws emerged very early in the research process. The 
meaning of ‘environmental management’ appears to take on a command and control 
notion. When requested to draw attention to the environmental management concerns 
Macro environmental 












challenging organizations in Shanghai, several Chinese senior managers tended to 
respond from the perspective of barriers encountered for the designing and 
implementation of environmental protection plans, referring to the state’s 
Environmental Protection Policy in China.  
 
When literally translated4, Huan Jing (environment) Guan Li (management) can be 
taken to mean ‘controlling ambiance’ such as atmospheric air and water. Searching 
through the Chinese environmental management literature, the terminology Huan Jing 
Guan Li did not appear to be commonly used other than in a journal by the same 
name.  By contrast, environmental ‘protection’ (Huan Jing Bao Hu) and 
environmental ‘policy’ (Huan Jing Zheng Ce) have frequently appeared in Chinese 
press articles and the terms were commonly spoken by respondents in reference to 
environmental management issues in Shanghai (Rowe 2006). 
 
Such a command and control inference of environmental management at the public 
macro-level was evidence by some of the following responses (emphasis in bold) to 
the question as to whether their enterprises had any environmental policies (Rowe 
2006, p. 108). 
 
// Environment policies, that is the political and economic environment // 
has to comply with environmental laws and regulations in all its 
projects. We have been aggressively developing new market areas and 
give preferential funding policies to prospective rising industries, such as 
high-tech…, green agriculture and environmental friendly projects// I think 
it is possibly due to the fact that it is a national issue, macro policy // 
 
The above mentioned quotations by respondents in support of the macro-level 
environmental policies and compliance-oriented views of environmental management, 
further supports the emphasis on ‘Coercive Government Institutional Involvements’. 
The findings from this study also revealed that the preferred environmental solutions 
                                                 
4 The researcher’s hosts in China (academics from Shanghai University of Finance and Economics) and 
business associates provided valuable Mandarin version of ‘environmental management’ – Huan Jing 
Guan Li. 
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of senior managers included: ‘coercive regulatory instruments’ such as, State 
environmental policies, laws and enforcements. 
 
Through constant comparison and amalgamation of related categories during the 
iterative process of coding, axial-coding and analysis in accordance with Strauss and 
Corbin (1990), the categories for ‘compliance’ and ‘manipulative capture’ were 
collapsed and merged with the major category on ‘compliance’.  
 
Extracts from respondents of 73% of the companies interviewed specifically voiced 
their concerns in relation to the monitoring and enforcements category (with emphasis 
highlighted in bold) included the following: 
 
// The scale of China’s land mass is so huge that it is simply a logistical 
problem attempting to monitor for environmental compliance. Rules and 
penalties situation not very effective. Monitoring problems due to periodical 
investigations at a certain point in time, not a continuous on-going process // 
…the lack of enforcement is a disappointment // The environmental 
protection board is weak and cannot enforce environmental rules and 
regulations. They require technology transfer and more government support to 
protect the environment // I doubt the government is efficient, and you have a 
conflict of interest. Here the government owns large amount of these heavy 
industries. These are the nastiest polluters // I actually think China has… some 
fairly good regulations, what is lacking in many cases is the enforcement // 
 
Reflected in the following quotations were the concerns of 20% of participating 
companies who felt that there were unequal enforcements of environmental standards 
for those larger or foreign corporations in comparison with the financially weaker, 
smaller or state-owned-enterprises (SOEs). The findings in this study confirm the 
view expressed in the literature (e.g., Ferris and Zhang 2002; Ma and Ortolano 2000).  
 
// Well, the government is already enforcing very strict environmental 
regulations on foreign investor enterprises in China.  I think the government 
should also enforce those regulations with local state owned enterprises. // one 
action that could be taken, is to enforce the existing regulations uniformly 
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across the whole industry of all sizes, of all origins who, be it multinational, be 
it SOEs, be it a local, whatever. // I would believe that you would see a 
tremendous improvement for the existing regulations to be finally enforced. // 
… different kind of company has different treatments by government. // 
 
These respondents were of the impression that State environmental standard 
enforcement was not uniform and varied across different economic sectors. The 
experience of foreign investors in China revealed that in general, foreign 
organizations were more stringently regulated than their local counterparts (interviews 
#11, #12 and #16). This is in part, due to Chinese regulators’ perceptions (SMEPB 
officials, pers. Comm..) that these companies from developed nations come from 
more advanced environmental management background with access to more 
sophisticated technologies, and should therefore operate at a higher environmental 
standard than their counterparts in China (Ferris and Zhang, 2002). Besides, foreign 
invested enterprises are seen as having the finance to install and operate appropriate 
environmental controls (interviews #11, #10, #12 and #16). 
 
4.2 Preferred Environmental Strategies 
Also, results reported in this paper indicated that senior managers and executives 
preferred solutions for China’s environmental problems ranged from the command 
and control strategy of government’s coercive regulatory instruments (60% of 
organisations), to a strategy of using communicative instruments such as public 
awareness education (53%) and market based incentives such as user taxes and 
tradable permits (40%). Extracts of some of these quotations from which these 
findings were derived are stated as follows:  
 
// Perhaps, imposing greater penalties and increasing resource prices, e.g., 
water and electricity rates // environmental taxes to increase // fund 
environmental protection schemes … use environmental taxes to fund // 
government must increase regulations, offers positive incentives, impose 
greater penalties, and develop cleaner technologies // environmental awareness 
// require a lot more education and public awareness // TV and newspaper 
media are doing a good job promoting public awareness // public pressure may 
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work // educating people to be environmental aware // Must include the cost of 
environmental degradation in pricing … internalising external costs? // we 
have no environmental protection problems … the officials must enforce 
greater rules on larger companies. //  
 
In conclusion, the findings of our in-depth investigation were similar to the results of 
another study (Fryxell and Lo 2002) in regards to respondents’ preferences for the 
‘command and control’ regulatory instruments to curtail environmental degradation in 
China. In a survey of managerial preferences for policy mechanisms used to address 
environmental problems, managers from Beijing, Dalian and Guangzhou favoured 
regulatory instruments, placing less faith in communicative and market instruments 
(Fryxell and Lo 2002). 
 
5. DISCUSSION  
Findings from this study indicating the key role of the States institutional involvement 
in environmental management is not surprising. Governments play a prominent 
institutional role in CEM practices and are referred to in both institutional and 
environmental research (e.g., Berman et al. 1999; Hoffman 2001; Shrivastava 1995). 
Government institutional bodies are able to establish laws that bind organizations to 
certain practices and procedures. Andrews (1998), in a survey of Fortune 500 CEOs 
in 1995, found that coercive legal requirements and public perceptions (i.e., 
reputations) were most important in driving environmental business strategy. 
 
It is evident from this study and rooted in the literature (e.g., Green and Yip 1993; Ma 
and Ortolano 2000; Ross 1994; Zhang 1997) that China has a significant 
environmental legislation in place that has been developed in the last two decades.   
China’s constitution (Article 9) establishes the State’s duty to conserve natural 
resources and wildlife, and Article 10 establishes the duty of persons and 
organizations to ensure rational land use (Ma and Ortolano 2000). 
 
However, in practice, the findings in this study echoed what the literature indicated 
(Ma and Ortolano 2000; Zhang and Wen, 2008) – that is, the weak monitoring and 
enforcements of environmental laws and rules has hampered the success of the central 
government’s environmental policy. For instance, interview #16 summarised this 
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succinctly (with emphasis added): “I actually think China has… some fairly good 
regulations, what is lacking in many cases is the enforcement.” This gap between 
China’s “sophisticated set of regulatory programs” (Ma and Ortolano, 2000, p. 8) and 
the lack of stringent enforcement of environmental laws and rules has been widely 
cited by various authors (e.g., Ferris and Zhang 2002; Green and Yip 1993; Ross 
1994; Stover 2000; Tang et al. 1997; Zhang and Wen 2008). 
 
According to institutional theory, (Oliver 1991; Tolbert and Zucker 1983) penalties 
and fines for non-compliance behaviour do not daunt organizations if government 
enforcement of environmental protection regulations and rules are perceived to be 
weak. This is attributable to companies’ reluctance to conform to environmental 
protection regulations when these rules and regulations are not widely diffused and 
accepted as the norm. Hence, corporations are less likely to mimic ‘best practices’ in 
CEM. 
  
Enforcement of environmental rules on polluting enterprises such as the SOEs were 
found to be problematic in this study and this lends support to the literature (Ma and 
Ortolano 2000; Wong and Chan 1996). There were economic, environmental and 
social implications in closing down these polluting Chinese SOEs, as they were 
traditionally responsible for paying retirement pensions and for providing workers 
with housing, health care and other social supports. This legacy of the “iron rice 
bowl” concept regarding lifetime employment expected by many SOEs workers still 
persisted late last century (Hughes 2002; Whiteley et al. 2000, p. 9), although to a 
lesser degree in contemporary China.  
 
However, the large iconic listed SOEs are seen to be actively engaging in CEM and 
disclosing their efforts (e.g., China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, CNOOC and 
Sinochem International Corporation). This is probably attributable to conforming with 
global institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) in legitimising their 
licence to practice (Deegan 2002; Mathews 1997) due to their size and public 
visibility. 
 
The SEPA estimated that at the beginning of the century, Chinese industry was a 
primary source of  pollution, accounting for about 40% of the nation’s water pollution 
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and about 80% of its air pollution (Wang et al. 2004). State enterprises in China 
pollute more per unit of output than non-state organizations and usually have lower 
operating efficiency utilizing older technologies (World Bank 1997). The SOE issue 
may explain Shenzhen’s success in meeting standards as it is a free-market Special 
Economic Zone with few SOEs (East Asian Executive Reports 1999). However, the 
Shanghai SOEs interviewed and observed in this study were more technologically 
advanced and had privileged access to funding for environmental upgrades from the 
state and international institutions (e.g., the Asian Development Bank and World 
Bank).  
 
In general, potentials for enforcement problems stem from the fact that municipal 
environmental protection authorities are mainly responsible for environmental 
enforcement activities in China. However, they are often less responsive to State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) than to the local governments, who 
frequently are major shareholders of polluting SOEs, creating an inherent conflict of 
interest (interview #11;Green and Yip 1993; Stover 2000). Many local governments 
are also concerned about unemployment that will result if they close down polluting 
factories or mines. Some localities may even ignore the environmental laws altogether 
as the traditional Chinese proverb goes: “heaven is high and the emperor is far away.” 
 
Zhang et al, (1999) attribute this weak enforcement of environmental policies and 
regulations to insufficient incentives and inadequate resources (e.g., funding and 
technology) for polluting enterprises to improve their environmental practices and for 
the authorities to compel these organisations to comply. The SEPA officials noted that 
a major obstacle to enforcement involves the large, financially weak SOEs, which are 
among the worst polluters, with outdated equipments and insufficient resources to 
modernize or implement pollution control (China Daily, 2002). 
 
To help understand the implementation gap between the good intentions of Chinese 
State institutional involvement (through macro environmental policies, compliance, 
monitoring and enforcement), and weak compliance due to lack of efficient 
monitoring and enforcement of environmental policies and laws, institutional 
constraints as a theoretical concept has been used to explain this phenomenon (Tang 
et al. 1997; Tsai and Child 1997). As explained above, institutional theory is a 
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plausible explanation for the resistance to widespread CEM in Shanghai. Institutional 
theoretical constraints explain in part, why China’s “sophisticated set of regulatory 
programs” (Ma and Ortolano, 2000, p. 8), did not translate to overall CEM.  
 
Undisputedly, the Chinese government’s past regulatory strategies have increased its 
effort to clean up the country’s air, land, water and in attempting to prevent further 
environmental degradation. However, until CEM becomes an institutional ‘norm’ in 
doing business and is widely embraced by industry, most organisations will continue 
to accept the status quo – business as usual scenario for CEM.  
 
6. CONCLUSION  
This paper reports on an empirical study grounded in senior managers’ perceptions of 
CEM in the PRC. ‘Coercive Government Institutional Involvements’ emerged as one 
of the major influencing factors in the empirical study of corporate environmental 
initiatives. This resonates well with the specialised literature as the State is a set of 
formal environmental institutions that can define the rules for corporate behaviour 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Consequently, Chinese companies are disclosing 
environmental information mainly to alleviate the concerns from the government (Liu 
and Anbumozhi, 2009). Governments are the most prominent mechanism capable of 
establishing laws that bind enterprises to certain practices and procedures (Shrivastava 
1995; Hoffman 2001; Rowe 2006).  
 
However, the empirical findings from the interviews and observations suggest that the 
government’s enforcement of compliance to environmental protection regulations 
appears to be spatial and ineffective. Hence, organisations in Shanghai were not 
deterred by the sanctions for non-compliance behaviour. For that reason, leading edge 
CEM activities might not be swiftly imitated or embraced. Thus, for organisations in 
emerging nations such as China, the institutional norm in environmental protection 
among most corporations is to adopt the “business as usual” scenario.  
 
In the current study, senior executives in Shanghai advocated the following preferred 
environmental strategies to encourage CEM: greater government’s coercive 
regulatory instruments (60% of companies); better communicative instruments such 
as greater transparency, public awareness education and media (53%); and market 
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based incentives such as user taxes and tradable permits (40%). The findings echo 
several authors’ suggestions that whilst governments play the dominant role in the 
formal institutional mechanism of environmental management, it can be enhanced 
through market promotion and public participation (Zhang et al. 2008; Zhang and 
Wen 2008).  
 
However, there are certain limitations that need to be noted. The study is limited to an 
investigation of CEM in Shanghai, but the implications of this exploratory research is 
that environmental management systems and standards that work in  developed 
nations should not be directly transplanted to developing nations without considering 
institutional contexts.  
 
Emanating from this study where the government is the major institutional actor, 
future research would heighten our understanding as to whether the process of 
initiating a shift towards environmental sustainability differs from the more developed 
economies. The results of the PRC government’s institutional impact on CEM, 
including its formal environmental laws and rules that influence (or constrain) the 
actions of business enterprises and managers within these institutions, form the 
foundation upon which future studies can be expanded.  
 
As can be observed from this study, the magnitude of China’s environmental 
challenges will make this most populous nation on earth a vast market for 
environmental management opportunities such as environmental technology, services 
and products. Meeting these environmental challenges will be economically and 
socially daunting. Nevertheless, as expressed by one senior manager of a SOE who 
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